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Abstract
Austrian political actors have improved the protection of  outsiders by expanding the coverage of  labour rights, social secu-
rity, and active labour market policy spending in the past two decades. The article attributes these ‘solidaristic’ traits of  Aus-
trian labour market policy change to the persistent reliance of  weak governments on trade union support in the mobilisation 
of  a durable consensus. When governments are internally divided and prone to reform deadlocks, they face a powerful in-
centive to share policy-making authority with the social partners. Despite a significant decline in power resources, the Aus-
trian trade union confederation has therefore remained influential enough to compensate outsiders for growing economic 
uncertainty on a volatile labour market. To substantiate this claim empirically, the article draws on primary and secondary 
sources as well as interview evidence with policy-making elites. 
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Angewiesen auf schwache Regierungen: 
Österreichische Gewerkschaften und die Politik der moderaten Dualisierung 
Zusammenfassung
Österreich erweiterte in den letzten zwanzig Jahren den Versichertenkreis des Arbeits- und Sozialrechts sowie aktive Ar-
beitsmarktpolitikausgaben zugunsten von „Outsidern“, d.h. atypisch Beschäftigen sowie erwerbsarbeitslosen Lohnabhän-
gigen. Der Artikel führt die solidarischen Kennzeichen österreichischer Arbeitsmarktreformen auf  inhaltliche Zugeständ-
nisse politisch schwacher Regierungen an die Gewerkschaften zurück. Wenn Regierungskoalitionen wie in Österreich intern 
gespalten und anfällig für Reformblockaden sind, haben sie einen starken Anreiz, die Sozialpartner zur Konsensmobili-
sierung in den Reformprozess miteinzubeziehen. Trotz eines erheblichen Machtverlusts blieb damit der österreichische 
Gewerkschaftsbund einflussreich genug, um Outsider für eine gewachsene ökonomische Unsicherheit auf  einem volatilen 
Arbeitsmarkt zu kompensieren. Um dieses Argument empirisch zu untermauern, greift der Artikel auf  Primär- und Sekun-
därquellen sowie Interviewevidenzen mit politischen Entscheidungsträgern zurück.
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1. Introduction
Rising inequality in labour markets and welfare has become 
a growing concern of  the comparative study of  advanced 
capitalist political economies. The problem of  inequality is 
particularly acute for the growing number of  atypical and 
unemployed wage earners: the so-called ‘outsiders’. Unlike 
‘insiders’ on permanent and full-time employment con-
tracts, their precarious attachment to the labour market 
often implies a lack of  adequate coverage in job security, 
social security, and training arrangements. Political actors, 
however, can shape the nature and degree of  insider-out-
sider divides through democratic state interventions in dif-
ferent ways (Emmenegger et al. 2012). While the neoliberal 
paradigm shift in the functioning of  national models of  
capitalism points to a general expansion of  market mecha-
nisms and economic inequality over time (Streeck 2009; 
Baccaro/Howell 2011), the political practise of  liberalisa-
tion at the national level has resulted in divergent distribu-
tive outcomes for outsiders (Thelen 2014). Therefore, it can 
be reasonably argued that the common liberalisation of  
post-war capitalism did not rule out variation in the reform 
trajectories of  national welfare states, nor did it imply con-
vergence in the redistributive capacities of  public policy 
regimes.
One interesting example of  this lack of  convergence can 
be seen in the case of  Austria. Declining coverage rates to 
the detriment of  outsiders would be the most likely distrib-
utive outcome produced by this Conservative-Continental 
regime prototype in a post-industrial context (Iversen/
Wren 1998; Scharpf  2000). Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent 
debates indeed view the Austrian political economy against 
the backdrop of  a German-like dualization that shifted the 
burden of  economic adjustment to outsiders of  the service 
sector (Palier/Thelen 2010; Hassel 2012; Thelen 2014). Yet, 
the reality of  the Austrian liberalisation path was quite 
distinct from that of  Germany. Despite similar historical 
and institutional legacies, Austrian political actors did not 
emulate the German adjustment path of  pronounced dual-
ization like other cases among the Conservative-Conti-
nental welfare regime type. Instead, the liberalisation of  
Austrian capitalism entailed selective elements that ran 
directly counter to the reinforcement of  institutional sta-
tus divides. A relatively limited share of  temporary and in-
voluntary part-time contracts on the one hand, and an ex-
panded coverage of  the social insurance on the other, per-
haps best illustrate the distributive outcomes of  ‘smoothed 
dualization’ within the historically evolved institutional 
constraints of  a Conservative-Continental welfare regime 
(Bock-Schappelwein/Mühlberger 2008; Eichhorst/Marx 
2012; Fervers/Schwander 2015). 
The findings I present below draw on the empirical as-
sessment developed by Obinger et al. (2012) that Austria 
may be considered a case of  smoothed dualization. In the 
area of  labour market policy, this claim refers to a set of  in-
stitutional changes that (i) homogenised the entitle-
ment conditions for severance payment (Abfertigung 
neu), (ii) extended the coverage of  the social insurance, 
and (iii) expanded active labour market policy (ALMP) 
spending; that is, policies enhancing the protection of  
outsiders. Recent comparative studies lend additional 
credibility to the claim that Austrian labour market 
policy change has been more ‘solidaristic’ relative to 
similar Conservative-Continental welfare states such 
as Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands 
(Eichhorst/Marx 2012; Fervers/Schwander 2015). 
Even though the Austrian politics of  labour market 
adjustment have been by no means free of  the broad 
neoliberal trend towards the re-commodification of  
labour (Atzmüller et al. 2012; Fink/Krenn 2014), the 
reform of  labour market policy has also been used to 
extend social entitlements to workers on the margins 
of  the labour force. 
This article is an inquiry into the reasons why 
Austrian political actors enhanced the social protec-
tion of  outsiders despite tightened fiscal constraints 
and neoliberal assaults from the political right. It 
argues that the crucial reason why Austria deviated 
from the German-like path of  pronounced dualiza-
tion was the persistent influence of  the Austrian trade 
union confederation, the ÖGB (Österreichischer Gewerk-
schaftsbund), on the policy-making process. It is clear 
that Austrian governments at various points in time 
actively sought to overcome the veto power of  the 
ÖGB in the interest of  unilateral fiscal consolidation 
(Tálos/Kittel 2001; Obinger/Tálos 2006). Yet, in the 
area of  labour market policy, they lacked the autono-
mous reform capacity necessary to reject a process 
of  negotiated adjustment that would include unions. 
This weakness of  Austrian governments, I claim, was 
necessary for the ongoing influence of  the ÖGB on 
the policy-making process, which caused precisely 
the ‘solidaristic’ elements that define the reform tra-
jectory of  smoothed dualization. 
The dominant government constellation in the 
neoliberal era has been that of  a grand coalition be-
tween two ideologically divided and similarly strong 
parties. Faced with severe economic challenges, their 
reform capacity was constrained by intra-coalitional 
divisions, which gave them strong incentives to del-
egate policy-making authority to a labour-inclusive 
‘social partnership’ (Sozialpartnerschaft). The ‘solidaris-
tic’ elements of  smoothed dualization have therefore 
not been a product of  partisan reform ambitions. It 
instead resulted from trilateral negotiations between 
employers, unions, and the state. Elections play little 
role when governments are notoriously divided and 
draw on close ties to well-established social partners. 
We would expect this negotiated reform process to 
open up opportunities for organised labour to ex-
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tract concessions from the state. Of  course, the charac-
ter of  and trade-offs involved in that political exchange 
changed over time, but the involvement of  unions re-
mained indispensable for this process. 
In contrast to employers, Austrian trade unions had 
a strong stake in the protection of  outsiders. The growth 
of  temporary ‘atypical’ workers exercised pressure on 
the prevailing labour and social security regulations of  
their core membership. This competitive pressure was 
most strongly felt by workers in the low-value-added 
service sector. In a labour movement where decisions 
are made by the confederal elite, precisely the demands 
of  these workers gain stronger attention than in decen-
tralised labour movements where the interests of  the 
powerful manufacturing unions often prevail (Hassel 
2012; Thelen 2014). With a high level of  labour unity, 
union leaders in Austria could use their policy-making 
influence to enhance the social protection of  outsiders, 
and not only a shrinking core of  insiders. 
That the influence of  organised labour was not en-
demic to institutional and cultural legacies of  Austrian 
post-war corporatism was powerfully demonstrated 
by the formation of  a strong government from 2000 to 
2006. Drawing on a high level of  ideological cohesive-
ness, the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition was indeed able to impose 
its policy preference on unions in a range of  issues, 
especially old-age pensions (Obinger/Tálos 2006; Bac-
caro/Simoni 2008). In the area of  labour market policy, 
however, the FPÖ blocked significant parts of  the ÖVP’s 
agenda to reinforce status divides. In response, the ÖVP-
FPÖ coalition fell back on trilateral negotiations with the 
social partners at some points in time (see also Afonso 
2013). Intra-coalitional divisions were therefore neces-
sary for the absence of  unilateral reform processes that 
would have excluded the one single actor that incorpo-
rated the interests of  outsiders in its political priorities: 
the unions.
My findings call into question the labour dualism 
theory advanced by David Rueda (2007), which attri-
butes growing insider-outsider divides to the political 
preference of  union movements in alliance with social-
democratic parties. In essence, his account conflates 
trade unions with ‘insiders’ that resist attempts to en-
hance the material situation of  ‘outsiders’ in order to 
defend their own privileged status quo. This is, as I will 
show, inaccurate in the case of  Austria, because here 
the mobilisation of  political support for outsiders was 
perfectly compatible with the interest representation of  
insiders. But the preferences of  unions are by no means 
causally determinative due to a shift in the balance of  
class power from labour to capital in the neoliberal era. 
My argument therefore emphasises the political oppor-
tunities unions face when governments are weak. Under 
conditions of  weakness, governments are more respon-
sive to the demands of  unions, because they need sup-
port from extra-parliamentary actors in the pursuit of  
consensus mobilisation.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I develop an 
argument about how the presence of  weak govern-
ments allowed Austrian unions to remain influential in 
the policy-making process to the benefit of  outsiders. I 
then demonstrate my argument through process-trac-
ing of  labour market reforms from the early 1990s to 
the early 2010s, using evidence from primary and sec-
ondary sources as well as semi-structured interviews 
conducted with policy-making elites. In the conclusion, 
I discuss the main findings and implications of  this case 
study. 
2. Organised Labour and Governments in Austria
The Austrian labour movement rests on a nationally 
distinct cooperation between two different interest or-
ganisations: the Chamber of  Labour (BAK) on the one 
hand, and the Austrian trade union confederation (ÖGB) 
on the other. The BAK represents the whole workforce 
due to mandatory membership in corporatist parity 
bodies such as the social insurance and the public em-
ployment service. By contrast, the ÖGB relies on volun-
tary membership and possesses the legal monopoly to 
conclude collective agreements, but unites with the BAK 
in advancing the interests of  labour within corporatist 
parity bodies. That one and the same person often holds 
leadership positions in both interest organisations fos-
ters the popular perception of  a united ‘labour block’ in 
Austrian politics. In fact, however, there is a clear divi-
sion of  responsibilities in the political process: the ÖGB 
determines the political priorities, whereas the BAK de-
livers the political expertise to achieve these priorities 
in the industrial and political arenas (Traxler/Pernicka 
2007, 223).
A recent finding in the dualization literature is the 
recognition that encompassing and centralised unions 
are better able to mobilise political support for outsid-
ers than small and decentralized unions (Palier/Thelen 
2010; Thelen 2014; Gordon 2015). First, encompassing 
unions organise a higher share of  outsiders, thereby di-
rectly incorporating their demands into the interest for-
mation process. Second, centralised unions prevent the 
formation of  particularistic policy priorities, because 
the confederal elite gives voice to affiliates with lower 
membership rates. Moreover, administrative roles in la-
bour market policy provide unions with strategic stakes 
in the protection of  the unemployed (Clegg 2012). 
The ÖGB forms part of  the five most inclusive union 
confederations in the OECD due to its unmatched levels 
of  concentration and centralisation (Gordon 2015). Its 
clear political mandate at the confederal level broadens 
the representational scope of  the union movement by 
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incorporating the political demands of  the less orga-
nized service sector in the interest aggregation process, 
thereby empowering them vis-à-vis their more organ-
ised counterparts in the manufacturing sector (Gordon 
2015, 90-91; see also Thelen 2014). Concentration and 
centralisation may therefore, at least to some extent, 
compensate for the incredible shrinking of  the ÖGB’s 
membership rates from 63 percent in 1970 to currently 
a mere 25 percent in the scope of  labour representa-
tion. The capacity to shift interest concentration to the 
highest level sets the ÖGB apart from the classical sec-
toral model of  German unionism. While also displaying 
a unitary structure, the German union confederation 
(DGB) lacks the institutionalised hierarchies to over-
come cross-sectoral divides in public policy-making 
(Heinisch 2000, 76). Unlike the ÖGB, the weak authority 
of  the DGB therefore underpins an unequal distribution 
of  power between different member unions, which fa-
vours a sectoral union framework and co-determination 
at the plant level.
Labour unity allowed for an inclusive representa-
tional focus when employers discovered the usage of  
atypical employment contracts as a way of  boosting 
flexibility and cost competitiveness. The ÖGB pursued 
a policy of  undermining intra-labour competition be-
tween ‘regular’ and ‘atypical’ workers by demanding an 
extension of  prevailing labour protections and social 
security arrangements to those workers who lack cover-
age in these respects. In a Conservative welfare regime, 
the enhanced social protection of  outsiders helps union 
confederations to re-gain bargaining power vis-à-vis em-
ployers, protect their core members from the low-wage 
competition of  ‘atypical’ employment contracts and 
reach out to workers at the margins of  the labour force. 
That said, the earnings-related nature of  benefit entitle-
ments in an age of  permanent austerity sets institution-
al constraints on attempts to improve the social security 
of  outsiders.
The formation of  inclusive union preferences, however, 
is not sufficient for a successful compensation of  outsid-
ers for growing economic uncertainty, because the grad-
ual decline in union power weakened the assertiveness 
of  labour in the policy-making process. An increase in 
unemployment rates in tandem with declining member-
ship rates in an age of  capital liberalisation refers to this 
shift in the balance of  class power from labour to capi-
tal. A unilateral reform strategy against the interests of  
unions has therefore become less risky for the electoral 
fortune of  national governments. A growing amount of  
literature documents the declining capacity of  unions 
to resist neoliberal reform ambitions of  partisan policy 
entrepreneurs (Baccaro/Howell 2011; Culpepper/Regan 
2014; Hassel 2015). But governments cannot impose any 
agreement on unions, when their own reform capacity 
is constrained by intra-coalitional divisions. This weak-
ness provides governments with a political incentive to 
trade policy concessions for union support in the mo-
bilisation of  a durable consensus. 
Weak governments and union influence
The core argument of  this article is that the presence 
of  a weak government is an important condition under 
which trade union confederations may retain political 
influence despite a decline in power resources. Weak-
ness, in our context, refers to a low level of  autono-
mous reform capacity, making governments unable to 
pursue a unilateral reform strategy that would exclude 
unions. Under this condition of  weakness, the delega-
tion of  policy issues to tripartite policy forums helps 
pre-empt open conflicts and move public attention away 
to depoliticised elite negotiations. In that sense, union 
confederations are not mere veto players that can block 
the reform ambitions of  governments. They can also 
help overcome intra-coalitional divisions through co-
operation with employers. The literature of  social pacts 
underlines this mechanism by showing that weak gov-
ernments are more responsive to the demands of  union 
confederations, because they require support from or-
ganised interests in the design, implementation, and 
legitimisation of  economic reforms (Baccaro/Simoni 
2008; Afonso 2013; see also Knotz/Lindvall 2015). This 
is especially the case in the Austrian context, where the 
social partners’ organisational power gives both sides of  
the class divide a high level of  autonomy vis-à-vis pres-
sure from below, which allows for mutual high-trust re-
lations and problem-solving capacity through informal 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’ (Heinisch 2000). 
One way that governments become weak is through 
intra-coalitional divisions between ideologically op-
posed and similarly strong parties. The Austrian grand 
coalition instructively demonstrated this type of  weak-
ness, given that its recognition for the necessity of  con-
sensus went hand in hand with mutual reform blockages 
in the past three decades. First, the challenges posed by 
the neoliberal era reinforced open distributive conflicts 
and put an end to the positive-sum game of  the boom-
ing ‘golden age’ post-war economy (Tálos/Kittel 2001). 
Naturally enough, negotiations around sharing the 
costs of  fiscal consolidation between two historically di-
vided camps hardened the political fronts. Second, the 
relatively balanced distribution of  parliamentary seats 
implied that both parties have been powerful enough to 
block each other, even though the SPÖ has always been 
somewhat stronger than the ÖVP in the period of  inves-
tigation (Obinger 2002). Third, both parties came under 
growing pressure from the rise of  the Green Party and 
the FPÖ, since the grand coalition partners have almost 
continuously lost vote shares over the past three de-
cades. We would expect all these factors to challenge the 
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ability of  a grand coalition to achieve a political consen-
sus around controversial issues. 
Close institutional and personal linkages between the 
two historical major parties and the social partner camps 
facilitated the delegation of  policy-making authority to 
a labour-inclusive social partnership. Vertical coordina-
tion in public policy usually takes place between the SPÖ 
and BAK-ÖGB on the one hand, and the ÖVP and WKÖ-
IV on the other. The Austrian Economic Chamber (WKÖ) 
is the counterpart of  the Austrian Chamber of  Labour 
(BAK) in representing every employer due to mandatory 
membership.1 In this highly integrated and corporatist 
‘small state’ environment (Katzenstein 1984), the SPÖ 
has not only established close personal and institutional 
ties to the ÖGB, which are important for union leaders to 
influence the legislature. The SPÖ has also been willing 
to grant significant agenda-setting capacity to social-
democratic union elites, because the latter can draw 
on the micro-level information of  constitutionally en-
trenched works councils and the macro-level expertise 
of  the resourceful BAK. Information and expertise are 
thus important tools deployed by the ÖGB to influence 
the policy-making action of  the SPÖ. Taken together, the 
interest organisations of  labour not only reflect an in-
formal veto player against unilateral reform initiatives 
of  SPÖ-led governments, but also act as a think tank for 
the party leadership.
But my argument about weak governments extends 
to parties of  the left as well as the right. The formation 
of  a centre-right coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ 
from 2000 to 2006 suggests a higher ideological cohe-
siveness relative to previous grand coalitions (Müller/
Fallend 2004). Yet, in the area of  labour market policy, 
the neoliberal agenda driven by the ÖVP came under 
strain from prolonged internal turmoil in the FPÖ. The 
overwhelming problem for the FPÖ as a governing party 
was how to reconcile the ideological tension between two 
opposing wings: the market-liberal government team 
on the one hand, and the populist grassroots wing on 
the other (Luther 2003). While sharing the ÖVP’s anti-
union stance, the electoral success of  the populist grass-
roots wing around Jörg Haider rested on its appeal to the 
social demands of  blue-collar workers. Faced with this 
intra-partisan tension, the centre-right coalition had to 
fall back on the social partners to achieve a durable po-
litical consensus at some points in time (Afonso 2013). 
With the onset of  the Great Recession and the return 
of  another grand coalition, the stage was finally set for 
a veritable revival of  Austrian social partnership (Tálos 
2008). The next section will show that the prevalence of  
weak governments created the necessary opportunity 
for unions to extract concessions for outsiders.
1 Unlike the WKÖ, the Austrian Federation of  Industries (IV) repre-
sents large industrial companies, but does not form an official part 
of  the Austrian social partnership in corporatist state bodies.
3. The Politics of Smoothed Dualization in Austria
The core economic problem faced by successive Austri-
an governments of  the 1990s was reducing public debt 
for successful accession to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). Declining economic growth 
and increasing unemployment rates translated into ris-
ing annual public deficits (5.8 percent in 1995), while the 
debt ratio surpassed the Maastricht threshold of  60 per-
cent in 1993. The structural impetus of  rising public debt 
during the politics of  EMU adjustment constrained the 
policy choices of  the ÖGB and provided the WKÖ with 
an opportunity to push for a shift to orthodox fiscal ad-
justment. The politics of  EMU adjustment culminated in 
the adoption of  two austerity packages in 1995 and 1996 
(Strukturanpassungsgesetze I & II), which reduced the an-
nual public deficit from 5.7 percent in 1995 to 1.8 percent 
of  GDP in 1997. 
Immediately after the 1994 elections, the grand co-
alition pursued a unilateral reform strategy to facilitate 
the consolidation of  public finances (‘52 points pro-
gramme’). For the first time in Austrian post-war his-
tory, the social partners were not formally involved in 
the policy-making process. Yet, when rising tensions 
between and inside the coalition partners around the 
design of  cost containment measures emerged, the new 
party chair of  the ÖVP, Wolfgang Schüssel, broke off 
the budget negotiations with no result and called for 
new elections. The subsequent election campaign took 
place against the backdrop of  two diverging approaches 
to the problem of  reducing public debt: a fifty-fifty ra-
tio of  revenue increases and spending cuts (SPÖ) versus 
spending cuts (ÖVP). Judging from the election outcome, 
the approach of  the SPÖ proved more popular than the 
fiscal retrenchment campaign of  the ÖVP (Wagschal/
Wenzelburger 2008, 104). The 1995 elections extended 
the share of  the SPÖ to 38 percent (+3 percent), while the 
ÖVP remained the second strongest party with 28.3 per-
cent (+0.6 percent). The coalition negotiations between 
the two major parties reflected the power-conscious 
party leadership of  Schüssel: the ÖVP could either form 
a coalition with the FPÖ or go into opposition, while the 
only option left for the SPÖ to remain in office was the 
formation of  another grand coalition.  Reflecting their 
bargaining position, the ÖVP made government partici-
pation conditional on the adoption of  a savings volume 
of  100 billion ATS for the next two years – with success. 
The subsequent formation of  another grand coalition in 
1995 paved the way for the proposal of  a second austerity 
package (Strukturanpassungsgesetz II) to meet the Maas-
tricht convergence criteria. 
Well aware of  the electoral dangers of  ongoing con-
flict and another reform deadlock, the government del-
egated pre-negotiations about the design of  the aus-
terity package II to the social partners. The subsequent 
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compromise between the ÖGB and the WKÖ played an 
important role in mitigating political conflicts between 
the grand coalition partners: ‘With the savings package 
the social partners proved that they were able to per-
form their function of  “easing the burden of  the state” in 
a very thorough way’ (Unger 2003, 107). Drawing on sur-
vey data and press coverages, Reinhard Heinisch notes 
that the Austrian populace came to trust the reform ca-
pacity of  the social partners more than that of  the grand 
coalition partners: ‘The social partnership was seen as 
delivering an important public good by ensuring overall 
stability and by diluting painful economic medicine as 
much as possible – at a time when the government ap-
peared increasingly less effective’ (Heinisch 2001, 40). 
It is clear that the welfare cuts of  the austerity pack-
age II in the context of  EMU adjustment were more ben-
eficial to capital than to labour. But the principal aim of  
reducing public debt gave rise to successful attempts of  
the ÖGB to enforce its demand for an extension of  the 
social insurance coverage (Tálos 1999, 274f.). For exam-
ple, the austerity package II included the quasi-freelanc-
ers and the dependent self-employed into statutory pen-
sion, health and accident insurance. The SPÖ came to 
support the policy demands of  the ÖGB, because the in-
terest organisation of  labour had a more informed view 
of  atypical employment contracts than the party lead-
ers.2 The Head of  the ÖGB’s labour market and education 
division, whom I interviewed, summarized the position 
of  the unions toward the social protection of  atypical 
employment contracts in the following terms: ‘Atypical 
employment contracts became an essential question for 
us when we recognised that their rapid growth poses a 
massive threat to regular employment contracts.’3 
Comparing the politics of  fiscal consolidation of  
nine countries in the late 1990s, Wagschal/Wenzel-
burger (2008) come to the conclusion that the reduction 
of  public deficits through the second austerity package 
was based on ‘a little bit of  savings everywhere’. This 
assessment resonates in characterising the Austrian 
corporatist politics of  small steps in hard times. Rather 
than seeking transformative change, the cooperation 
between the social partners reflects a consensual policy-
making logic of  incremental change. Following this pat-
tern of  adjustment, the interest organisations of  labour 
remained sufficiently influential to prevent any large-
scale retrenchment initiatives. The final settlement con-
tained in the second austerity package reflected a com-
promise between the balanced approach of  the SPÖ and 
the cutback agenda of  the ÖVP.4
2 Interview with Eleonora Hostasch, Minister of  Labour Market, 
Health Care, and Social Affairs of  the SPÖ (1997-2000), 27th Janu-
ary 2015.
3 Interview with Alexander Prischl, Head of  Labour Market and Edu-
cation Division of  the ÖGB, 5th March 2015.
4 Consisting of  a ratio of  one third of  revenue increases and two 
thirds of  expenditure cuts, the final bill affected different social 
In the years to come, union influence faced mount-
ing pressure from political forces rather than economic 
adjustment constraints. From the perspective of  promi-
nent representatives of  the ÖVP, the power resources of  
organised labour blocked competitiveness-enhancing 
policy innovation. In particular, the veto power of  the 
ÖGB under SPÖ-led grand coalitions led to the strate-
gic understanding of  Wolfgang Schüssel and his chief  
ideologue, Andreas Khol, that the disempowerment of  
organised labour had become imperative for the accom-
plishment of  an economic paradigm change (Khol 2001, 
209f.). At the same time, the rise of  the FPÖ under its 
charismatic leader Jörg Haider opened up a potential co-
alition partner that shared the critical stance of  the ÖVP 
against union influence on public policy. Eventually, 
the FPÖ became the second strongest party in the 1999 
elections (26.9 percent; +5 percent) at the expense of  the 
ÖVP (26.9 percent; -1.4 percent), while the SPÖ took the 
largest vote share in spite of  losses (33.2 percent; -4.9 
percent). Once again, the strongest party, the SPÖ, invit-
ed the ÖVP to form a grand coalition. Unlike in 1995, the 
failed coalition negotiations between the SPÖ and ÖVP 
paved the way for the formation of  a centre-right coali-
tion that aimed at the break with the consensus-oriented 
past of  Austrian social partnership.
The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition started out as an ideological-
ly cohesive and united front that pushed through a re-
markable series of  reforms from the beginning of  2000. 
Cost containment and deregulation were the prime 
cornerstones of  the government’s economic agenda. To 
implement this agenda, the government had to rely on 
its parliamentary majority and suspend the corporatist 
logic of  union involvement in public policy (Obinger/
Tálos 2006). In late 2000, the government unilaterally 
legislated the following labour market policy changes: 
a reduction in the family surcharge and in federal con-
tributions to labour market policy; a reduction of  the 
basic replacement rate from 57 percent to 55 percent; an 
extension of  the qualifying period from 26 to 28 weeks, 
and; the freezing of  benefit indexation as well as tight-
ened sanctions (Fink 2006, 181). 
However, the government’s reform zeal came under 
strain from intra-coalitional divisions in 2001. Election 
losses at the regional level in tandem with the ÖVP’s 
neoliberal agenda prompted growing opposition from 
the employees’ wing of  the FPÖ against welfare state 
retrenchment (Müller/Fallend 2004, 825). Their fear 
was that another series of  ÖVP-led neoliberal reform 
initiatives would cause further disaffection among blue-
groups in bearing the costs of  fiscal adjustment. In the words of  
Helmut Kramer, Head of  the Austrian Institute of  Economic Re-
search (WIFO), on the design of  the second austerity package: ‘This 
time it is noticeable that this package – I am almost inclined to say 
primarily – makes the higher earners foot the bill’ (Wirtschaftswoche 
08.02.1996).
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collar workers, a group that had turned into an electoral 
stronghold of  the FPÖ during the 1990s (Luther 2003). 
In an interview with the author, Andreas Khol high-
lighted the veto of  Herbert Haupt, the FPÖ’s Minister of  
Social Affairs, as a source of  reform deadlocks in labour 
market issues.5
The politics behind the homogenisation of  the sever-
ance pay scheme, the Abfertigung neu, reveal a great deal 
about the intra-coalitional tensions that ruled out a uni-
lateral reform strategy in the area of  labour market pol-
icy. By mid-2001, the ÖVP-FPÖ government announced 
it would transform the severance payment scheme into 
an occupational pension pillar alongside the statutory 
public pension insurance – a hot-button issue for or-
ganised labour. The old severance pay scheme was the 
subject of  broad criticism for its supposed detrimental 
impact on labour market mobility and the requirement 
that the employee be formally dismissed by the employ-
er (EIRO 2001). As eligibility for severance pay required 
employees to work for three years for one employer and 
refrain from a notice of  employment resignation, the 
old scheme provided very generous payments for insid-
ers of  the private sector with continuous employment 
biographies.6 In fact, only 15 percent of  annual contract 
dissolutions led to severance pay entitlements (Obinger/
Tálos 2006, 91). 
Yet, internal disputes over the minimum duration of  
employment for entitlement to the accumulation of  sev-
erance pay marred the autonomous reform capacity of  
the ÖVP-FPÖ government (EIRO 2002). The ÖVP under 
Schüssel demanded strict adherence to the government 
programme, according to which entitlement to sever-
ance pay should require one year of  employment (Wiener 
Zeitung, 23.5.2001). In contrast, the FPÖ contended for 
entitlement to severance pay from the first day of  em-
ployment onwards. The centre-left opposition and the 
ÖGB shared the position of  the FPÖ. In addition, the 
ÖVP and WKÖ vigorously opposed the FPÖ’s demand 
for an entitlement for cases of  contract dissolutions by 
employees (ibid.). 
When the controversial negotiations between the 
coalition partners appeared to become deadlocked, the 
ÖVP-FPÖ government delegated the issue to the social 
partners (Pernicka 2003). In the words of  a senior offi-
cial in the Ministry of  Labour Market and Social Affairs, 
who was involved in the reform process: ‘The ÖVP and 
5 Interview with Andreas Khol, Party Whip of  the ÖVP (1994-1999, 
2000-2002), 9th December 2014. Unfortunately, I was not able to 
reach Herbert Haupt for an interview to cross-validate the descrip-
tions provided by Andreas Khol. 
6 The level of  severance payment amounted to two months of  the 
gross wage after three years of  service; three months of  the gross 
wage after five years of  service; four months after 10 years; six 
months after 15 years; 9 months after 20 years; and 12 months after 
25 years. The severance pay was subject to a flat-rate income tax of  6 
percent.
FPÖ did not manage to find an agreement on the basis of  
the government programme. In response, both parties 
agreed to delegate the Abfertigung neu to the social part-
ners, which developed the so-called 14 cornerstones of  
the subsequent reform.’7 
This party-political reform deadlock forms one nec-
essary condition for the subsequent policy solution. An-
other part of  the explanation comes from encompassing 
representational union interests. Since the late 1990s, 
the BAK and ÖGB demanded an extension of  the cov-
erage of  the insider-oriented severance pay scheme to 
the whole workforce (EIRO 2001). After long-standing 
negotiations, the social partners jointly proposed a new 
scheme, which entitled all private sector employees to 
accumulate individual savings from the first day of  em-
ployment onwards and across different employment re-
lationships over time. In return, the WKÖ could reduce 
non-wage labour costs for severance pay provisions 
through the stipulation of  an employer’s contribution 
rate of  1.53 percent of  the gross monthly wage. Unlike 
the Continental European trend of  dualization in job 
security regulations, Austria unified the conditions of  
severance payment in favour of  discontinuous employ-
ment biographies.
In a similar vein, the FPÖ blocked the ÖVP in the area 
of  eligibility conditions for the long-term unemployed. 
Similar to the German Hartz IV legislation, in their 2000 
and 2003 government programmes, the Austrian cen-
tre-right government announced to introduce an obliga-
tion to work in return for continued benefit receipt and 
state-financed pay top-ups (‘1-Euro jobs’). Asked about 
why the government did not implement its government 
programme in this aspect, Khol responded that the FPÖ 
came to block it.8 His description about the veto of  the 
FPÖ under Haupt was confirmed by the Head of  Depart-
ment for Labour Market Policy in the Ministry of  So-
cial Affairs.9 Instead of  pursuing a unilateral approach, 
the government invited the social partners to develop 
changes for the regulation of  the unemployment benefit 
entitlement (Afonso 2013, 163f.). 
The ÖVP and the WKÖ had a common agenda in that 
they demanded (i) a broadened definition of  the kind 
of  jobs that are deemed suitable (Zumutbarkeitsbestim-
mungen) and (ii) the removal of  ‘occupational protec-
tion’ for job seekers with specific skills (Berufsschutz). 
According to this agenda, the Public Employment Ser-
vice would have been able to require the unemployed to 
take up more types of  jobs over longer travel distances. 
 
7 Interview with senior official in the Ministry of  Labour Market and 
Social Affairs, 29th May 2015.
8 Interview with Andreas Khol, Party Whip of  the ÖVP (1994-1999, 
2000-2002), 9th December 2014.
9 Interview with Stefan Potmesil, Head of  Labour Market Depart-
ment in the Ministry of  Social Affairs (2000-2010), 27th August 
2015. 
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To achieve support for this approach, organised labour 
received two concessions (ibid.). First, the occupational 
protection remained in place for a shortened duration of  
100 days. Second, the package included the introduction 
of  a ‘wage guarantee’; that is, a guarantee that the wage 
level of  a proposed job corresponds at least to a certain 
percentage of  the previous job. As a result, a job may be 
deemed suitable if  its related wage amounted to not less 
than 80 percent of  the previous job during the first 120 
days of  unemployment or 75 percent during the end of  
the benefit entitlement period. Instead, part-time work-
ers received a wage guarantee of  100 percent for every 
proposed job placement. 
The ‘black-blue’ era ended with the 2006 elections. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the SPÖ won the elections 
with slight losses (-1.2 percent) despite the collapse of  
an ÖGB-led ‘red’ bank (BAWAG) in the wake of  failed 
speculative transactions. On the other hand, the ÖVP 
lost a whole 8 percent, whereas the new party of  Jörg 
Haider, the BZÖ, managed to gain entry into parliament 
(4.1 percent). Eventually, it took the SPÖ more than four 
months to reach a coalition agreement with the ÖVP in 
order to form another grand coalition.
The policy performance of  the grand coalition since 
2007 powerfully demonstrates that union influence may 
increase under favourable party-political conditions. 
Announcing to (re-)involve the peak level associations 
in virtually all areas of  economic and social policy, the 
government programme of  2007 mentions ‘the social 
partners’ no less than 21 times (Tálos 2008). Unlike the 
politics of  EMU adjustment during the 1990s, the grand 
coalition did not set strict policy guidelines along which 
the social partners helped formulate reforms to con-
solidate the federal budget. On the contrary, economic 
growth rates at the level of  3.5 percent/GDP (2006/07) 
facilitated the maintenance of  sound public finances un-
til the onset of  the Great Recession.  
The return of  the SPÖ to office under Alfred Gusen-
bauer was one obvious reason for increasing union in-
fluence. In fact, however, the grand coalition as a whole 
benefited from corporatist concertation through the 
problem-solving capacity of  the social partners. During 
the period of  uncertainty that followed the 2006 elec-
tions, the interest organisations of  labour successfully 
attempted to find agreement with the WKÖ on a number 
of  policy areas to pre-empt the emergence of  unilateral 
reform proposals (Afonso 2013, 171f.). One central lesson 
of  the previous ÖVP-FPÖ government was that the vi-
ability of  union influence might require the occupation 
of  policy issues in uncertain times. In addition to the 
proactive strategy of  the social partners, the subsequent 
grand coalition faced difficulties in finding policy com-
promises. Mutual reform blockages and open confron-
tations between the coalition partners created tensions 
that culminated in the call for fresh elections after only 
one and a half  years in office. The interest organisations 
of  labour, however, had an interest in maintaining the 
grand coalition to perpetuate their influence through 
the SPÖ’s participation in the ruling coalition. High re-
form activity in spite of  intra-coalitional divisions sug-
gests the social partners’ stabilising effect on the reform 
capacity of  the government. Indeed, as Emmerich Tálos 
finds (2008, ch. 5), the national peak level associations 
somewhat offset the government’s difficulties in carving 
out policies by playing a pivotal role in the preparation 
of  government reforms. 
The result of  this power-distributional configura-
tion – union influence due to a ‘weak’ SPÖ-led grand 
coalition – was a series of  political exchanges that ex-
panded the protection of  outsiders in return for tight-
ened activation demands. Proof  of  this exchange came 
in the amendment of  the unemployment insurance law 
in 2007, which legislated an extension in the coverage of  
the unemployment insurance and educational leave in 
return for tightened eligibility conditions through lon-
ger travel distances and availability requirements (Ob-
inger et al. 2012, 184). Asked about why the ÖGB priori-
tised the expansion of  labour and social rights to atypi-
cal forms of  employment, the Head of  the ÖGB’s labour 
market and education division, responded, 
Some employers say: ‘You can either work for me as a 
freelancer or as a new self-employed. Full stop.’ What 
should I do in case I am unemployed? Then I will pre-
fer an offer like this over having nothing. And once I am 
employed under these conditions, it’s hard to re-gain a 
regular contract. This is a development we had discov-
ered and we wanted to address. Not because we are the 
mere representatives of  the new self-employed, but 
rather because we see that these types of  contracts lead 
to a general decline of  regular jobs in regular work sec-
tors.10  
The 2008 elections, which occurred in the wake of  in-
ternal conflicts, led to the formation of  another grand 
coalition. Immediately after taking office, the SPÖ-ÖVP 
government under Werner Faymann invited the social 
partners to design a tripartite policy response to the on-
set of  the Great Recession. Faced with a severe GDP con-
traction of  almost 4 percent in 2009, the three actors 
were quick to find a consensus around a series of  policy 
changes aimed at: (i) the stabilisation of  employment 
and (ii) re-integration of  people out of  work. Perhaps 
the most prominent change was the extension of  short-
time work, first to 18 and then 24 months. This was tai-
lored to similar measures in Germany, given Austria’s 
strong trade relationship with its larger neighbouring 
10 Interview with Alexander Prischl, Head of  Labour Market and Edu-
cation Division of  ÖGB, 5th March 2015.
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country, especially in automobile production. Overall, 
the short-time work strategy was considered effective 
in retaining qualified staff, thereby mitigating the cor-
rosive effects of  the Great Recession on employment 
levels. 
In addition to the short-time work extension, the 
policy response to the Great Recession included an ex-
pansion of  training arrangements such as labour foun-
dations in tandem with eased access to partial retire-
ment. To finance these changes, the grand coalition in-
creased ALMP spending by €400 million (44 percent) 
in 2009 (Atzmüller/Krenn/Papouschek 2012, 27f.). As a 
result, in 2010 and 2011, Austria achieved the third and 
fourth highest ALMP expenditure rates, respectively, in 
proportion to the unemployment rate and GDP in the 
OECD (BMASK 2012, 2013). Further upskilling invest-
ments came into force in 2013: the qualified employees’ 
grant (Fachkräftestipendium) and educational part-time 
work (Bildungsteilzeit) (EIRO 2013). The former eases ac-
cess conditions on re-training for low-skilled employed 
and unemployed workers. The latter addresses employed 
workers who pursue a reduction in working time to at-
tend training activities by offering a monetary compen-
sation for wage losses. Overall, the labour market policy 
response to the crisis thus simultaneously involved both 
instruments to keep existing jobs (e.g. short-time work) 
and combat unemployment (e.g. training) while refrain-
ing from benefit cuts for people out of  work at the same 
time.
4. Conclusion
The case of  Austria illuminates two points about the pol-
itics of  labour market policy in the era of  liberalisation. 
First, where unions are united, they are able to support 
the social demands of  outsiders. The virtue of  labour 
unity is that it gives voice to member unions, which are 
hit hardest by the low-wage competition from atypical 
employment contracts. This institutionalised hierarchy 
of  the ÖGB sets Austrian unionism apart from the clas-
sical sectoral model of  German unionism. Another fac-
tor that deserves attention is the role the WKÖ played 
in maintaining cooperative relations with the ÖGB. The 
principle of  mandatory membership was undeniably 
central to its commitment to the ‘social partnership’. 
This institutional compulsion on employers implied 
that small firm owners could not defect from corporat-
ist arrangements in favour of  a market-clearing adjust-
ment strategy at the firm level. It therefore ruled out the 
full neoliberal reorientation characteristic of  business 
associations in countries with similar corporatist lega-
cies (Paster 2013). Unlike the ÖGB, however, the first-
order priority of  the WKÖ was reducing labour costs 
and reservation wages to the detriment of  outsiders.
Second, however, the causal significance of  union 
preferences is not determinative. On the contrary, a 
decline of  the workforce that is unionised in an age of  
capital liberalisation might well legitimise a unilateral 
reform strategy that excludes the preferences of  unions 
from the policy-making process (Culpepper/Regan 
2014, Hassel 2015). That a united majority allows gov-
ernments to override union confederations was pow-
erfully demonstrated by the policy performance of  the 
ÖVP-FPÖ coalition (Obinger/Tálos 2006). In 2003, for 
example, the FPÖ supported the ÖVP in imposing a uni-
lateral pension reform on organised labour, because cost 
savings in the public pension system formed an impor-
tant part of  its electoral claim to put an end to the ac-
cumulation of  public debt (Müller/Fallend 2004). This 
common agenda explains why the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition 
was strong enough to refrain from labour acquiescence 
in the 2003 pension reform. In the area of  labour market 
policy, however, the ÖGB remained influential enough 
to receive concessions over virtually the entire period of  
investigation. The question is, why?
This article attributed the persistence of  union in-
fluence to the inability of  Austrian governments to find 
a durable consensus independent from the problem-
solving capacity of  a labour-inclusive ‘social partner-
ship’. When governments are not sufficiently united to 
act unilaterally in the policy-making process, they can-
not fend off the political demands from others. They in-
stead reach out to trade unions, because social partner 
negotiations provide them with an extra-parliamentary 
channel of  consensus mobilisation. This weakness best 
explains why Austrian governments pursued a labour-
inclusive reform strategy despite fiscal constraints 
(1990s), neoliberal policy platforms (2000-2006) and 
the onset of  the great recession (post-2008 years) in an 
age of  declining union power. The political choice of  
weak governments to share policy-making authority 
with organised interests provides trade unions with the 
opportunity to resist increased inequality in employ-
ment and welfare standards. When that political choice 
shifts to a unilateral reform strategy, the result excludes 
that opportunity to the detriment of  atypically em-
ployed and unemployed workers.
Literature
Afonso, Alexandre (2013). Social Concertation in Times 
of  Austerity: European Integration and the Politics 
of  Labour Market Reforms in Austria and Switzer-
land, Amsterdam.
Atzmüller, Roland/Manfred Krenn/Ulrike Papouschek 
(2012). Innere Aushöhlung und Fragmentierung des 
österreichischen Modells: Zur Entwicklung von Er-
werbslosigkeit, prekärer Beschäftigung und Arbe-
54  P. Rathgeb: Relying on weak governments I OZP Vol. 45, Issue 3
itsmarktpolitik, in: Karin Scherschel/Peter Streckeisen/
Manfred Krenn (Hg.): Neue Prekarität: Die Folgen ak-
tivierender Arbeitsmarktpolitik – europäische Län-
der im Vergleich, Frankfurt/New York, 75–110.
Baccaro, Lucio/Sang-Hoon Lim (2007). Social Pacts as Co-
alitions of  the Weak and the Moderate, in: European 
Journal of  Industrial Relations, Vol. 13(1), 27–46.
Baccaro, Lucio/Marco Simoni (2008): Policy Concerta-
tion in Europe: Explaining Government’s Choice, in: 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41(10), 1323–1348.
Baccaro, Lucio/Chris Howell (2011). A Common Neoliber-
al Trajectory: The Transformation of  Industrial Rela-
tions in Advanced Capitalism, in: Politics & Society, 
Vol. 39(4), 521–563.
Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumenten-
schutz (2012). Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Öster-
reich. Internet: http://www.ams.at/_docs/001_Ak-
tive_Arbeitsmarktpolitik.pdf
Bundesministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Konsumentenschutz 




Bock-Schappelwein, Julia/Ulrike Mühlberger (2008). Be-
schäftigungsformen in Österreich: Rechtliche und 
quantitative Aspekte, WIFO Monatsbericht, Austri-
an Economic Research Institute, Wien.
Clegg, Daniel (2012). Solidarity or Dualization? Social 
Governance, Union Preferences and Unemployment 
Benefit Adjustment in Belgium and France, in: Pat-
rick Emmenegger/Silja Häusermann/Bruno Palier/Mar-
tin Seeleib-Kaiser (Hg.): The Age of  Dualization: The 
Changing Face of  Inequality, Oxford, 253–276.
Culpepper, Pepper D./Aidan Regan (2014). Why Don’t Gov-
ernments Need Trade Unions Anymore? The Death 
of  Social Pacts in Ireland and Italy, in: Socio-Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 12(4), 723–745.
Eichhorst, Werner/Paul Marx (2012). Whatever Works: 
Dualization and the Service Economy in Bismarck-
ian Welfare States, in: Patrick Emmenegger/Silja 
Häusermann/Bruno Palier/Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (Hg.): 
The Age of  Dualization: The Changing Face of  In-
equality, Oxford, 73–99.
European Industrial Relations Observatory (2001). Reform 
of  Severance Pay under Discussion, 27.06.2001. In-
ternet: http://eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/
eurwork/articles/reform-of-severance-pay-under-
discussion (Last accessed at March 15, 2017).
European Industrial Relations Observatory (2002). Social 
Partners Agree Far-Reaching Reform of  Severance 
Pay, 18.12.2001. Internet: http://www.eurofound.eu-
ropa.eu/eiro/2001/12/feature/at0112231f.htm (Last 
accessed at March 15, 2017).
European Industrial Relations Observatory (2007). Social 
Partners Tackle Unemployment and Skills Deficit, 
21.12.2007. Internet: http://www.eurofound.europa.
eu/eiro/2007/11/articles/at0711039i.htm (Last ac-
cessed at March 15, 2017).
Fallend, Franz (2006). Die ÖVP, in: Emmerich Tálos/Mar-
cel Fink (Hg.): Schwarz-Blau: Eine Bilanz des „Neu-
Regierens“, Wien, 3–18.
Fervers, Lukas/Hannah Schwander (2015). Are Outsiders 
Equally Out Everywhere? The Economic Disadvan-
tage of  Outsiders in Cross-National Perspective, in: 
European Journal of  Industrial Relations, Vol. 21(4), 
369–387. 
Fink, Marcel (2006). Zwischen „Beschäftigungsrekord” 
und „Rekordarbeitslosigkeit”: Arbeitsmarkt und Ar-
beitsmarktpolitik unter Schwarz-Blau/Orange, in: 
Emmerich Tálos/Marcel Fink (Hg.): Schwarz-Blau: 
Eine Bilanz des „Neu-Regierens“, Wien, 170–187.
Fink, Marcel/Manfred Krenn (2014). Prekariat und Work-
ing Poor: Zum Verhältnis von Erwerbsarbeit und 
sozialer Inklusion in Österreich, in: Nikolaus Dim-
mel/Martin Schenk/Christine Stelzer-Orthofer (Hg.): 
Handbuch Armut in Österreich, 2. Aufl., Wien.
Hassel, Anke (2014). The Paradox of  Liberalization: Un-
derstanding Dualism and the Recovery of  the Ger-
man Political Economy, in: British Journal of  Indus-
trial Relations, Vol. 52(1), 57–81.
Hassel, Anke (2015). Trade Unions and the Future of  
Democratic Capitalism, in: Pablo Beramendi/Silja 
Häusermann/Herbert Kitschelt/Hanspeter Kriesi (Hg.): 
The Politics of  Advanced Capitalism, Cambridge.
Heinisch, Reinhard (2000). Coping with Economic In-
tegration: Corporatist Strategies in Germany and 
Austria in the 1990s, in: West European Politics, Vol. 
23(3), 67–96.
Heinisch, Reinhard (2001). Defying Neoliberal Conver-
gence: Austria’s successful Supply-Side Corporatism 
in the 1990s, in: Environment and Planning C: Gov-
ernment and Policy, Vol. 19(1), 29–44.
Iversen, Torben/Anne Wren (1998). Equality, Employ-
ment and Budgetary Constraint: The Trilemma of  
the Service Economy, in: World Politics, Vol. 50(4), 
507–546.
Katzenstein, Peter J. (1984). Corporatism and Change. 
Austria, Switzerland and the Politics of  Industry, 
Ithaca/New York.
Khol, Andreas (2001). Die Wende ist geglückt: Der 
schwarze-blaue Marsch durch die Wüste Gobi, Wien.
Knotz, Carlo/Johannes Lindvall (2015). Coalitions and 
Compensation: The Case of  Unemployment Ben-
efit Duration, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 
48(5), 586–615.
Luther, Kurt (2003). The Self-Destruction of  a Right-
Wing Populist Party? The Austrian Parliamentary 
Election of  2002, in: West European Politics, Vol. 
26(2), 136–152.
P. Rathgeb: Relying on weak governments I OZP Vol. 45, Issue 3 55
Müller, Wolfgang C./Franz Fallend (2004). Changing Pat-
terns of  Party Competition in Austria: From Multi-
polar to Bipolar System, in: West European Politics, 
Vol. 27(5), 801–835.
Obinger, Herbert (2002). Veto Players, Political Parties 
and Welfare State Retrenchment, in: International 
Journal of  Political Economy, Vol. 32 (2), 44–66.
Obinger, Herbert/Emmerich Tálos (2006). Sozialstaat Ös-
terreich zwischen Kontinuität und Umbau: Eine Bi-
lanz der ÖVP/FPÖ/BZÖ-Regierung, Wiesbaden.
Obinger, Herbert/Peter Starke/Alexandra Kaasch (2012). 
Responses to Labor Market Divides in Small States 
Since the 1990s, in: Patrick Emmenegger/Silja Häuser-
mann/Bruno Palier/Martin Seeleib-Kaiser (Hg.): The 
Age of  Dualization: The Changing Face of  Inequality 
in Deindustrializing Countries, New York, 176–200.
Palier, Bruno/Kathleen Thelen (2010). Institutionalizing 
Dualism: Complementarities and Change in France 
and Germany, in: Politics & Society, Vol. 38(1), 119–
148.
Paster, Thomas (2013). Why Did Austrian Business Op-
pose Welfare Cuts? How the Organization of  Inter-
ests Shapes Business Attitudes Toward Social Part-
nership, in: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 47(7), 
966–992.
Pernicka, Susanne (2003). Arbeitsbeziehungen nach der 
rechtskonservativen Wende: Sozialpartnerschaft in 
der Krise? In: Kurswechsel 3/2006, 84–87.
Rueda, David (2007). Social Democracy Inside Out: Gov-
ernment Partisanship, Insiders, and Outsiders in In-
dustrialized Democracies, Oxford.
Scharpf, Fritz (2000). The Viability of  Advanced Welfare 
States in the International Economy: Vulnerabilities 
and Options, in: Journal of  European Public Policy, 
Vol. 7(2), 190–228.
Tálos, Emmerich (1999). Atypische Beschäftigung in Ös-
terreich, in: Ibid. (Hg.): Atypische Beschäftigung: 
Internationale Trends und sozialstaatliche Regelun-
gen, Wien, 36–81.
Tálos, Emmerich/Bernhard Kittel (2001). Gesetzgebung 
in Österreich. Akteure, Netzwerke und Interaktionen 
in politischen Entscheidungsprozessen, Wien.
Tálos, Emmerich (2008). Sozialpartnerschaft: Ein 
zentraler politischer Gestaltungsfaktor in der Zweit-
en Republik, Innsbruck.
Thelen, Kathleen (2014). Varieties of  Liberalization: The 
New Politics of  Social Solidarity, New York.
Wagschal, Uwe/Georg Wenzelburger (2008). Haushalts-
konsolidierung, Wiesbaden.
Unger, Brigitte (2003). Austrian Social Partnership. Just a 
Midlife Crisis? In: Frans van Waarden/Gerhard Lehm-
bruch (Hg.): Renegotiating the Welfare State: Flexible 
Adjustment through Corporatist Concertation, New 
York, 97–114.
Author
Philip Rathgeb is a postdoctoral researcher at the De-
partment of  Politics and Public Administration at the 
University of  Konstanz. His principal research areas 
are comparative political economy and welfare states. 
He earned his PhD from the Department of  Political 
and Social Sciences at the European University Institute 
in September 2016. His doctoral research was awarded 
with the Theodor Körner Prize in honour of  outstand-
ing young academics in the areas of  Law, Social Sciences, 
and Economics. 

